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1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
The Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society dated October-December 
1710 contained a now well-known contribution entitled “An Argument for Divine 
Providence, taken from the constant Regularity observ’d in the Births of both 
Sexes.” It was written by John Arbuthnot, and forms the starting point for the 
present paper, in which I discuss the dispute provoked by Arbuthnot’s paper 
among a number of noted Continental mathematicians. Comments on some as- 
pects of the ensuing debate have been made by Todhunter [1865, 130, 197-1981 
and by Pearson [1978,301-3021, but there seems to be no complete account of the 
interactions among the various participants. 
John Arbuthnot (1667-1735) was a Fellow of the Royal Society and of the Royal 
College of Physicians. Short reviews of his life and works can be found in 
[Stephen & Lee 1917; Eisenhart h Bimbaum 19671, and very full accounts in 
[Aitken 1892; Beattie 19351. He was physician to Queen Anne, indeed, at one time 
said to be the favorite among her physicians in ordinary; he was a noted wit and 
satirist, a close colleague of Jonathan Swift, and the creator of the character John 
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Bull [Arbuthnot 17121; and he was reputed to be an able mathematician. It is 
thought that when he first moved to London from his homeland of Scotland he 
spent some of his time teaching mathematics. He is usually credited with a transla- 
tion from Latin, which appeared in 1692, of Huygens’ probability tract “De ludo 
aleae” [1657], and in 1700 he published an Essay on the usefulness of mathemati- 
cal learning. 
The 1692 translation of Huygens’ tract was included in the supplemented edi- 
tion of the Miscellaneous works of the late Dr. Arbuthnot [1751J, and seems to 
have been correctly attributed to Arbuthnot. Evidence in favor of his authorship is 
discussed by Todhunter [ 1865,48-491 and by Beattie [ 1935,335]. The 1692 edition 
was not solely a translation of Huygens’ work. Arbuthnot added solutions to the 
problems Huygens had posed at the end of the tract, and some further sections of 
his own about gaming with dice and playing cards. He also prefaced the transla- 
tion with an introduction written in typically robust style, showing something of 
his breadth of vision and wit. 
Arbuthnot’s paper in the Philosophical Transactions of 1710, which forms the 
focus of the present article, argued that the guiding hand of a divine being was to 
be seen in the nearly constant ratio of male to female christenings in London over 
the years 1629 to 1710. The data that Arbuthnot presented showed that during 
these 82 years the annual number of male christenings had been consistently 
rather higher than the number of female christenings, though never very much 
higher. The highest ratio of males to females, 1.156, was in 1661 (equivalent to a 
proportion of male births of 0.536), while the lowest ratio, 1.011, was in 1703 
(proportion of male births 0.503). Arbuthnot’s paper was transmitted to the Soci- 
ety through the hands of William Burnet, son of Gilbert Burnet, the Bishop of 
Salisbury, and was read at the Royal Society meeting on April 19, 1711 [Royal 
Society 1702-1714, 2751. Given the date of the meeting, and given that the paper 
contained data relating to the entirety of the year 1710, it is evident that the issue 
of the Philosophical Transactions in which it was subsequently printed, although 
dated October-December 1710, appeared belatedly, like other issues around that 
time. 
The paper provoked comment among the members of the Royal Society at 
subsequent meetings, as well as some correspondence between Arbuthnot and 
John Chamberlayne [Ross 1956, 206-2081, later the translator of Bernard 
Nieuwentijt’s Het regt gebruik der wereldbeschouwingen (The right use of 
the contemplation of nature). When the minutes of the April 19 meeting were 
read at the following meeting of the Society, on April 26, 1711, a Mr. Hill- 
presumably Abraham Hill, twice the Treasurer of the Royal Society, and one of 
the Council of the Society named in the Royal Charter-alluded to an even more 
striking pattern of male: female offspring, observing that the present King of 
Morocco was said to have had 900 sons and no daughters. The guiding hand in this 
case was decidedly less than divine, however, because it was also recounted that 
the king had ordered any female offspring to be stifled at birth! [Royal Society 
1702-1714, 2771. 
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At the next meeting after that, on May 10, 1711, a more substantial contribution 
by Gregory King was read, containing figures of the number of males and females 
in various age groups in London in 1696, and in which King advanced a theory 
concerning the relative chances of male and female births [Royal Society 1702- 
1714, 285-2871. Arbuthnot had concluded his paper by saying that “there seems 
no more Probable Cause to be assigned in Physicks for this Equality of the Births, 
than that in our first Parents Seed there were at first formed an equal Number of 
both Sexes.” Gregory King’s hypothesis was that, as fecundity in both males and 
females varied with age, the relative ages of husband and wife at conception of the 
child influenced the likelihood of the offspring’s being male or female, according 
to how near peak fecundity each of the parents was. If the husband was at his 
peak, the child would be male; if the wife was at her peak, the child would be 
female. If both were at their respective peaks, the male influence would predomi- 
nate over the female. Readers of a modern persuasion might be tempted to read a 
certain element of sexism into this last aspect of King’s theory! 
2. ARBUTHNOT’S STATISTICAL ARGUMENTS 
The statistical logic of Arbuthnot’s argument has already been given a thorough 
examination, notably by Hacking [1965, 75-81; 1975, 166-1711, and it is not my 
intention to go into detail over that ground in the present paper. However, it will 
be useful, in order to put the sections that follow into context, to recap the 
essentials of Arbuthnot’s “proof.” He likened each birth, or more strictly speak- 
ing christening, to the toss of a fair, two-sided die with its faces marked M and F 
for male and female, respectively. He then argued that if a large, even number of 
such dice were tossed, the probability of observing exactly equal numbers of M’s 
and F’s, given by the middle term of a binomial expansion, is very small indeed. 
In modern idiom, 
is small for large, even n. He also asserted, without any explicit justification, that 
the probability is small of never observing a considerable excess of M’s over F’s, 
or F’s over M’s, in a succession of such tosses. He suggested, in other words, that 
the probability in the tails of the distribution is not negligible. Finally, he observed 
that the probability of a “male” year-that is, one in which M’s predominate over 
F’s-is rather less than half. Assuming it to be one-half, he concluded that the 
chance of observing 82 successive male years was (t)82, a number of the order of 
1O-25 or 10-26. The probability of observing the data given the “model” (as we 
might now say) was very small, casting severe doubt on the notion that chance 
determined sex at birth. From there, he went on to a number of conclusions of a 
religious or philosophical nature, including the observation that his proof vindi- 
cated the undesirability of polygamy in a civilized society. 
The argument that natural phenomena of many kinds showed evidence of care- 
ful and beneficent design, and were therefore indicative of the existence of a 
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supreme being-the “argument from design”- was of considerable influence 
both theologically and scientifically during the latter decades of the 17th century 
and during much of the succeeding century [Hacking 1975, 82-84, 166-1751. In 
the inaugural series of Boyle lectures in 1692, Richard Bentley drew on the scien- 
tific work of Newton and Boyle to develop the argument [Bentley 1693c, 18381. It 
was probably around this time that Arbuthnot began to speculate on the possibility 
of contrasting two hypotheses concerning the narrow and persistent imbalance 
between the numbers of males and females: one based on the idea of divine 
providence and the other on the notion of “chance” expressed quantitatively as in 
problems of dice. 
The Boyle lectures delivered in 1711 and 1712 by William Derham were also an 
extensive elaboration of the argument from design. Derham was then Rector at 
Upminster and was, like Arbuthnot, a very active member of the Royal Society. 
His lectures were published in 1713 under the title Physico-theology: or, a dern- 
onstration of the being and attributes of God, from His works of creation. In 
Holland, Bernard Nieuwentijt had in preparation a rather similar work, which 
appeared in 1715 in Dutch, and was translated into English by John Chamberlayne 
in 1718 as The religious philosopher: or, the right use of contemplating the 
works of the Creator. Both Derham and Nieuwentijt cited Arbuthnot’s paper, 
Derham briefly but Nieuwentijt in some detail, as we shall see later. 
Arbuthnot’s advancement of the argument from design did not in itself, there- 
fore, single him out from his contemporaries. Nor were his observations of the 
constancy of the male: female birth ratio, and his ensuing comments on polyg- 
amy, new or radical. Remarks of the same kind were to be found 50 years earlier 
in John Graunt’s Natural andpolitical observations made upon the bills of mortal- 
ity [1662]. What was novel in Arbuthnot’s paper was his attempt to provide a 
mathematical or statistical proof of his assertions, based on a quantitative concept 
of chance, and with the argument expressed in numerical terms. His argument 
concerning the probability of a run of 82 “male” years has secured him a place in 
statistical history because its structure is recognizable as that of a statistical 
significance test, the “sign test,” which can be found in many modern introduc- 
tory probability and statistics tests (e.g., [DeGroot 1986, 572-5731). 
Bentley’s series of Boyle lectures contains precursors to the style of argument 
that Arbuthnot used in his 1710 paper. In his fifth sermon, Bentley rubbished the 
atheistic notion that mankind and the various species of the animal kingdom were 
the viable survivors of a vastly wider range of organisms that had arisen fortui- 
tously in a bygone age. He stressed how unlikely it was, assuming species to come 
about by “chance” conglomeration of their constituent organs, that two like 
members of the same species, or a male and female of the same species, should 
ever occur. Adapting an analogy used by Cicero in his de naturu Deorum, he 
allued to the very large number of possible orderings of the 24 letters of the 
Latin alphabet. Then, making the conservative assumption that a human body had 
one thousand constituent parts, he pointedly asked “if only XXIII1 parts . . . may 
be so multifariously placed and order’d, as to make many Millions of Millions of 
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Rows: in the supposition of a thousand parts, how immense must that capacity of 
variation be?” [Bentley 1692, 30-33; 1838, 113-1151. 
His seventh sermon contained a similarly styled argument, this time in respect 
of the formation of the planets by chance coincidence and accretion of particles of 
matter (the theory that had prompted Cicero to use the simile of random orderings 
of the letters of the alphabet). Bentley was concerned to show that the force of 
gravity, divinely bestowed and maintained, was necessary to account for the 
formation of the planets, and that chance alone could not provide a satisfactory 
explanation. He considered a pair of particles (“atoms”) in space, and drew the 
analogy of two ships placed at opposite poles of a globe ten thousand times 
greater in area than the Earth, then left to drift. He asked rhetorically, “Is it not 
utterly incredible, that our two Vessels, placed there Antipodes to each other, 
should ever happen to concur? . . . but the Atoms may not only fly side-ways, but 
over likewise and under each other: which makes it many million times more 
improbable, that they should interfere than the Ships” [Bentley 1693a, 20; 1838, 
159; Cohen 1978, 3351. Again in relation to the formation of the planetary system, 
Bentley suggested in his eighth sermon that it would be extremely improbable for 
all the planets to end up moving in the same direction round the Sun, and all in 
virtually the same plane, if the system had been formed fortuitously: “ ‘tis millions 
of millions odds to an unit in such a Cast of a Chance” [Bentley 1693b, 5-6; 1838, 
180; Cohen 1978,365-3661. The closeness of the planes of the planetary orbits was 
later to provide the basis of another early example of statistical significance test- 
ing, when Daniel Bernoulli examined the phenomenon in 1734 [Todhunter 1865, 
222-2241. 
In developing the implications of the atheistic theories about fortuitous creation 
of the Earth and its inhabitants, in order to demolish those theories, Bentley was 
apparently thinking in quantitative terms about chance and probability. But he 
was able only to sketch his models of supposed “chance” coincidence (of organs, 
particles, or ships), and therefore limited himself to very broad comments on the 
orders of magnitude of some of the relative probabilities that might be involved. 
Eighteen years later, with a better knowledge of the emerging “doctrine of 
chances,” Arbuthnot set out a much more specific statistical model to represent 
“chance” determination of sex at birth, and was able to carry his argument 
through with the aid of numerical calculations. In doing so, he anticipated the 
characteristics of the modern “sign test.” The dictionary entry for “sign test” in 
[Kendall & Buckland 19821 is “a test of significance depending on the signs of 
certain quantities and not on their magnitudes.” Typically, when a sign test is 
done, the probability distribution associated with the number of, say, positive 
signs is binomial with probability parameter 4, given the truth of the statistical 
hypothesis to be tested. For example, a common application is in testing an 
assumed value for a population median. Let the hypothesis to be tested, H, be that 
the median value of a particular variate X in a well-defined population is $I. The 
evidence available for the test comprises n independent observations xi (i = 1, 2, 
. . .) n) of X sampled randomly from the population. If the population median is 
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indeed I,$ then prior to collecting the evidence, the number of sample xi values 
greater than J, (that is, with sign(xi - JI) = 1) has a binomial probability distribution 
with parameters n and 1. The further into the tails of this distribution the observed 
number of positive signs for (xi - $) falls, therefore, when the sample evidence is 
gathered, the weaker the support afforded to the hypothesis H by the sample 
evidence. 
In Arbuthnot’s case, the statistical hypothesis set up for testing was that the 
probability of a “male” year was 4, the supposition that he used in this section of 
his paper to represent “chance” determination of sex at birth. Given the truth of 
the hypothesis, then in a sample of 82 “independent” years, the number of male 
years has associated with it a binomial probability distribution with parameters 82 
and a. Viewed from a modern perspective, the probability of (f)82 on which hinged 
Arbuthnot’s dismissal of the “chance” hypothesis can be seen to be one of a well- 
defined reference set: the binomial probabilities of Y male years out of 82, with 
Y=O,l,..., 82. It is the lowest of the probabilities in this reference set; 
because it is the most extreme it is also a tail-area probability; and it is an ex- 
tremely low probability. Only the last of these points was made explicit in Ar- 
buthnot’s original paper. He was concerned to show that the probability of the 
observed data, given the assumption that “chance” regulated the occurrence of 
male and female births, was very low, thereby casting doubt on this supposition 
that chance was the governing influence. The precise manner in which this low 
probability was to be interpreted so as to yield the conclusion was not articulated. 
A brief review of modern reinterpretations of Arbuthnot’s test, and further refer- 
ences to them, can be found in [Eisenhart & Birnbaum 19671. 
Arbuthnot’s paper provoked a discussion during the succeeding few years that 
involved a number of reputed mathematicians, the major figures being: 
Niklaus Bernoulli (1687-1759), a nephew of Jakob Bernoulli; 
Willem (or Guillaume) ‘sGravesande (1688-1742), a Dutch scientist who in 
1718 became Professor of Mathematics at the University of Leiden; 
Bernard Nieuwentijt (1654-1718), a Dutch physician and mathematician. 
Sections 3 and 4 below examine the good-natured debate that took place between 
Niklaus Bernoulli and Willem ‘sGravesande. Certain aspects of their exchanges 
can be seen as attempts to emulate and develop Arbuthnot’s mode of statistical 
reasoning, though their arguments are perhaps not as amenable as Arbuthnot’s 
has been to a successful reinterpretation within modern frameworks of statistical 
logic. 
3. ‘sGRAVESANDE’S TRACT 
Arbuthnot’s paper aroused the interest of the Dutch mathematicians ‘sGrave- 
sande and Nieuwentijt. Nieuwentijt had in preparation a work (referred to 
above, Section 2) that appeared in 1715, in Dutch, entitled Het regt gebruik der 
wereldbeschouwingen (The right use of the contemplation of nature). It was 
quickly translated into several other languages, and appeared in an English trans- 
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lation, by John Chamberlayne, in 1718 under the title The religious philosopher: 
or, the right use of contemplating the works of the Creator. The objective and 
scope of the work were similar to those of Derham’s Physico-theology, though 
the mix of sciences in Nieuwentijt’s book had more of a leavening of anatomy. 
He included a summary of Arbuthnot’s “proof,” and a table containing the data 
on which it was based, Arbuthnot’s paper having been sent to him by William 
Bumet. He followed this with an account of ‘sGravesande’s calculations and 
conclusions on the subject, which as we shall see were an attempt to elaborate 
Arbuthnot’s argument and give it even greater mathematical force. The tract that 
‘sGravesande prepared on the subject in 1712 had been circulated to a number of 
acquaintances, including Nieuwentijt, but it was not published at the time. It was 
later included, more than 30 years after his death, in Oeuures philosophiques et 
mathe’matiques de Mr G. J. ‘sGrauesande [1774], along with some portions of the 
correspondence that he had with Niklaus Bernoulli. Although the mathematics of 
‘sGravesande’s work were his own doing, there remains the possibility that his 
interpretation of the problem in hand may have been influenced by Nieuwentijt. 
‘sGravesande (possibly prompted by Nieuwentijt) felt that Arbuthnot could 
have put the case for divine providence even more strongly than he had done, had 
he troubled to engage in a more detailed calculation using the binomial distribu- 
tion. In ‘sGravesande’s interpretation of the problem, the probability of the ob- 
served data, given the hypothesis that “chance” governed the sex of children 
born, was the probability of observing, in each of 82 consecutive years, the num- 
ber of male births falling between two specific values, defined by reference to the 
extremes of the observed data. This he set out to estimate. Because the annual 
number of christenings was variable from one year to the next, the binomial 
expansion needed to calculate the required probabilities also varied. To overcome 
this difficulty, he based his calculations on an “average” year, that is, a notional 
year in which the number of births was taken equal to the observed average for the 
run of 82 years, namely 11,429. He next picked out the two years with the most 
extreme values for the proportion of male christenings: 1703 when the proportion 
was lowest and 1661 when it was highest. Resealing these two extreme values to a 
total number of births equal to 11,429 gave 5745 as the lowest “observed” number 
of male births and 6128 as the highest. Then, using a binomial expansion with n = 
11,429 and r = 8, he calculated the probability of observing, in any one year, 
between 5745 and 6128 male births, and found it to be about 0.2917 (a Gaussian 
approximation now gives a value of 0.2873). Raising this figure to the power of 82 
gave the probability of observing the number of male births within these two 
limits, 5745 and 6128, in each of 82 successive “average” years (with n = 11,429). 
The probability was of the order of lOeM or IO- 45. The main features and results of 
‘sGravesande’s calculations were reported approvingly by Nieuwentijt. 
We see that, like Arbuthnot, ‘sGravesande had based his argument on the 
supposition that the probability of a male birth would be 4 if “chance” governed 
the determination of sex at birth. Also following Arbuthnot’s example, ‘sGrave- 
sande had calculated the probability of the observed data, under this assumption, 
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and found it to be very low, throwing doubt on the supposition underlying it. 
‘sGravesande, though, had calculated the probability of an event that was much 
more specifically defined with reference to the observed data than Arbuthnot’s 
had been. As a consequence, a much lower probability figure resulted. Viewed 
from a modern perspective, it is apparent that the event whose probability 
‘sGravesande estimated, namely 82 successive years of “observations” between 
the values 5745 and 6128, is not easily related to a convenient reference distribu- 
tion. Arbuthnot’s is, as I noted above in Section 2. The most generous interpreta- 
tion of ‘sGravesande’s method would be to take the reference distribution for a 
single year’s births as a binomial with n = 11,429 and r = 4, and regard his 
probability of 0.2917 as an approximate summation of lowest-probability terms 
from this distribution, that is, of the tail-area probability, 
The summation was nor over a complete tail area, because its upper limit was a 
male births figure of 6128, rather than 11,429, but for all practical purposes it can 
be regarded as such, because the probability of observing more than 6128 male 
births in any one year is so small. It is not obvious that ‘sGravesande thought of it 
in this way, even though it is evident from his calculations that he knew the 
probabilities beyond 6000 male births to be virtually negligible. 
Karl Pearson [1978,301-3021, who read the account of ‘sGravesande’s solution 
in Nieuwentijdt’s book, shorn of some of its mathematical detail, felt that ‘sGrave- 
sande must have devised a short method of summing the tails of a binomial. This 
was not the case, however. Apart from some minor sophistications to cut down 
the calculation involved, ‘sGravesande did the summation longhand. He observed 
that, under the hypothesis of “chance” determination of sex, all terms in the 
binomial expansion involve the factor (!J)‘~,~*~, so the relative sizes of individual 
probabilities are given by the binomial coefficients (11/29). Moreover, adjacent 
coefficients bear a very simple numerical relationship to each other, so after one is 
calculated, the next can be very easily obtained; and after that one, the next; and 
so on. His procedure would be described in modern phraseology as making use of 
a recurrence relationship. He assigned the highest value coefficient in the distribu- 
tion, the one corresponding to the birth of 5715 males and 5714 females, the 
arbitrary value 100,000. He then calculated the “chances,” on this arbitrary scale, 
of 5716 male and 5713 female births as 
1,000,000 x (5714/5716) = 99,965, 
of 5717 male and 5712 female births as 
99,965 x (5713/5717) = 99,895, 
and, in general, the “chances” C, of m male and (11,429 - m) female births as 
C,n-l x (11,429 - m + 1)/m. 
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He continued the calculations until the “chances” had dropped below 1, at the 
term corresponding to 5973 male and 5456 female births, resulting in an extensive 
table of arbitrarily scaled probabilities. Twice the sum of all the chances in the 
table gave the total 13,1%,800. The sum of all the chances from m = 5745 to m = 
6128 he took as 3,849,150, including an allowance for the uncalculated fractional 
chances between m = 5974 and m = 6128. The ratio between these two sums, 
3,849,800/13,196,800 = 0.2917, 
was the probability he was seeking, of observing between 5745 and 6128 male 
births, out of 11,429 total births, a single year. 
4. BERNOULLI’S COUNTERARGUMENT 
During the latter part of the year 1712, Niklaus Bernoulli spent some time in 
England. He and ‘sGravesande were well known to each other, and they met 
while Bernoulli was en route to England. ‘sGravesande brought into their discus- 
sions the subject of Arbuthnot’s paper. Although Bernoulli was apparently un- 
aware of it until ‘sGravesande broached the subject, his interest was sufficiently 
aroused to follow it up in London with members of the Royal Society. He dis- 
agreed with the inferences Arbuthnot and ‘sGravesande drew from the data, and 
tried to convince William Bumet and John Craig of the Royal Society that an 
alternative interpretation was more reasonable. The Journal Book of the Royal 
Society for that year does not mention him by name as a visitor at any Society 
meetings. It is a little surprising if he did not take the opportunity to attend, though 
the absence of his name may be at least partly explained by the customary ad- 
journment of the Society’s meetings between July and October that year. Ber- 
noulli corresponded with ‘sGravesande from England, and from the Continent 
after his return toward the end of the year. Aware that Nieuwentijdt intended to 
use Arbuthnot’s argument in his forthcoming book, he expressed his doubts to 
‘sGravesande about the wisdom of this. He sent ‘sGravesande an excerpt from a 
letter he had written to Burnet, setting out in detail his own mathematical working 
on the question. For his part, ‘sGravesande explained the method and results of 
his own calculations. 
Pierre Remond de Montmort was another correspondent to whom Bernoulli 
expressed his views about Arbuthnot’s argument for divine providence. Indeed, it 
was mainly through the letters that Bernoulli sent to de Montmort in October 1712 
and January 1713 that Bernoulli’s work on the subject became known, because the 
correspondence was published in the second edition of de Montmort’s Essai 
d’analyse sur les jeux de hazard in 1713 (both the first and the second editions of 
de Montmort’s Essai were published without his name on the title page). The 
account in the correspondence with de Montmort is in most respects the same as 
in the letter sent to Bumet, and copied to ‘sGravesande, in 1712. A portion of this 
earlier correspondence was, as noted above (Section 3), included in ‘sGrave- 
sande’s Oeuvres philosophiques et mathkmatiques [ 17741. 
The essence of Bernoulli’s counterargument was that the assumption of v = 4 
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for the probability of a male birth, on which both Arbuthnot and ‘sGravesande 
founded their logic, was too restrictive an interpretation of “chance.” The fair 
two-sided die could be replaced by a multifaceted die, with rather more faces 
marked M than F, without taking away the element of “chance.” If tossed a large 
number of times, such a die would, Bernoulli maintained, yield ratios of M’s to 
F’s within the limits exhibited by the christenings data for London, with M’s 
consistently predominating over F’s No appeal to divine providence was there- 
fore necessary to account for either the persistent superiority of male over female 
births, or the narrow variation in the male : female birth ratio. Bernoulli’s percep- 
tion in this respect has been rightly commended by historians of probability 
[Todhunter 1865, 130-131; Hacking 1965, 77; Hacking 1975, 168, 170; Pearson 
1978, 161-1621. 
The framework of Bernoulli’s calculations was akin to that of ‘sGravesande’s. 
This similarity of approach may have emerged during their discussions while 
Bernoulli was en route to England. Unlike ‘sGravesande (and Arbuthnot), though, 
Bernoulli took a value for 7rTT, the probability of a male birth, different from f. He 
also made the mathematics of his calculations more elegant by deriving a simple 
expression that gave him an approximation for the sum of terms in the binomial 
expansion. Consider a random variable M that has a binomial probability distribu- 
tion with parameters n and V. Let /.L = nv, q~ = n(1 - 7~), and PI denote the 
probability that M lies between (p - I) and (p + I). Bernoulli showed that, if n is 
large in relation to 1, then to a good approximation, 
PI/(1 - PI) > min i[ 
P+l 
q--l+1 
xP+lX(Pu* 
/.L 1 /l ’ 
[ 
(o+l xcp+l p 112 
/..&-I+1 cp “cp II - 1. 
As Hald [I9841 has recently shown, this approximation was a very good one, 
much better than the one provided by the famous theorem of Niklaus’ uncle 
Jakob in Am Conjecrundi [1713], and almost as good as De Moivre’s later “nor- 
mal” approximation [1733]. Niklaus’ proof did not, though, have the same degree 
of mathematical rigor as Jakob’s. Hald refers to Niklaus’ approximation as the 
“missing link” between Jakob Bernoulli and De Moivre. 
I have examined in detail elsewhere [Shoesmith 19851 some of the statistical 
aspects of Niklaus Bernoulli’s counterargument, and will therefore be content 
with only a summary here. In his letters to de Montmort, Bernoulli took r = 18/35 
as the probability parameter of the binomial representing the births in an individ- 
ual year. Like ‘sGravesande, he simplified the problem by taking a single fixed 
value for the parameter n. Bernoulli made a subjective choice, n = 14,000, guided 
by the data but possibly also made with a view to rendering the calculations less 
onerous. The annual totals of christenings varied between about 6000 and 15,000 
over the period 1629-1710, so Bernoulli’s choice of n = 14,000 was well toward 
the upper end of the observed range. Also like ‘sGravesande, Bernoulli resealed 
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the observed numbers of male and female christenings in proportion to his chosen 
fixed value for n. He then picked out the year with the lowest proportion of male 
christenings, 1703, in which the resealed number of male christenings was 7037, 
163 less than the “expected” value of 7200 (= 14,000 x 18/35). Using his approxi- 
mation for summing terms of the binomial, he next calculated the odds that the 
male births figure would differ by no more than 163, either way, from the expected 
value of 7200. He found the odds to be at least 43.5 : 1 on: that is, a probability of 
around 0.978 (a normal approximation gives 0.994). Finally, observing that in 11 
years out of the 82, the resealed number of male christenings had fallen outside 
these limits (above the upper limit in every case), he argued that the odds of 
getting figures outside the prescribed limits no more than 10 times in a run of 82 
years (and within them at least 72 times) were at least 226: 1 on. 
Bernoulli was satisfied that his calculated odds ratios proved his point. Accord- 
ing to his model, the odds on observing variation within the range shown by the 
data were high, demonstrating that a chance mechanism could give rise to appar- 
ent regularity and consistency when applied to large numbers of observations. His 
uncle Jakob had, he recalled, derived a similar result in Ars conjectandi, and it 
would be interesting, when the book was printed, to compare the relative merits of 
their respective approximations (the manuscript of Ars conjectandi was unpub- 
lished on Jakob’s death in 1705, and eventually appeared in print in 1713). Niklaus 
Bernoulli seemed to be using a criterion similar to that of Arbuthnot and ‘sGrave- 
sande in judging the success of his model: namely, the probability of the observed 
data given the assumptions of the model. Arbuthnot and ‘sGravesande argued that 
the very low probabilities they derived cast severe doubt on the supposition about 
“chance” that underlay their calculations. Conversely, Bernoulli countered that 
the very high probability he obtained vindicated his own assumptions. Bernoulli’s 
probability, though, was a summation over a set of events of relatively high 
probability, and has the implication that the observed data, containing 11 figures 
outside the limits he had prescribed, was among the class of low-probability 
events according to his model. The variability characteristic of his model was low 
compared with that shown by the data. A simple chi-square analysis of the chris- 
tenings figures shows, indeed, that a binomial model does not provide a good fit to 
the data [Anscombe 1981,301]. Bernoulli’s is obviously a better model of the data 
than ‘sGravesande’s, but with the benefit of 250 years’ hindsight we can see that it 
might be improved. 
There was one marginal improvement that Bernoulli apparently set aside, 
namely an improved value for 7~. The ratio 18/35 acquired a certain degree of 
permanency in relation to this set of data: for example, we find it cropping up 
almost a hundred years later in Laplace’ The’orie analytique des probabilitks 
[ 18 121, when Laplace used the data as an example of his large-sample approxima- 
tion for binomial probabilities (Laplace found the probability of the male births 
figure falling within 163 of the expected value to be 0.994). But 18/35 was slightly 
less than the observed ratio of male to female christenings aggregated over the 82 
years (0.5143 to four decimal places as compared with 0.5163). This particular 
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choice of m had the effect of slightly biasing Bernoulli’s model with respect to the 
data, and consequently he found that in defining the limits of his summation by 
reference to the year with the lowest proportion of male births, 11 resealed obser- 
vations fell above the upper limit. The figure 18/35 seems to have come about 
through rounding of an earlier calculation. In his letter to Burnet, Bernoulli had 
used the ratio 7237/14,000, 7237 being the average number of male births on a 
resealed basis. The ratios 14/27, 15/29, 16131, and 17/33 would all have given a 
closer approximation to 7237/14,000 than 18/35, but Bernoulli may have wanted a 
denominator that was a convenient divisor of 14,000. Scaling down 7237/14,000 to 
a denominator of 35 would have given a numerator of 18.0925, which Bernoulli 
evidently rounded down to 18. 
I have also noted elsewhere [Shoesmith 19851 the difficulty of providing a 
convincing explanation for Bernoulli’s estimate of 226 : 1 for the odds on at least 
72 observations within the prescribed limits. If the probability that a single obser- 
vation will fall within the limits is 43.58/44.58, as Bernoulli had calculated, the 
probability of observing no more than 10 observations outside the limits in 82 
years is more than .99999. It is difficult to see how Bernoulli could have made such 
a substantial underestimate. It may simply have been an error of transcription or 
of printing. 
5. CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
Bernoulli and ‘sGravesande were not at issue over mathematics, nor indeed 
over statistical logic. What was at issue was the interpretation of “chance” in this 
context, the nature of statistical stability, and perhaps a reputation or two. De 
Moivre took an interest in the dispute, and it may have provided some stimulus to 
his examination of continuous approximations to the binomial. More obviously, it 
formed part of a growing interest in the study of statistical ratios as a sign of divine 
orderliness in the world. 
Bernoulli and ‘sGravesande reached a position of compromise by drawing a 
distinction between two facets of Arbuthnot’s argument. This compromise later 
drew De Moivre’s approval [De Moivre 1756,252-2531. ‘sGravesande maintained 
that if “chance” had been the prime determinant of the mechanism by which sex 
was decided, male and female births would have been equally probable. He had 
been concerned to demonstrate, in a more forceful way than Arbuthnot had done, 
that the notion of equal probabilities was untenable in light of the evidence. The 
initial determination of probabilities, therefore, was evidently the work of a divine 
being. Bernoulli, on the other hand, had shown that, once the question of the 
initial probabilities had been resolved, the narrowness of the confines within 
which the christenings figures fell followed naturally from the calculus of probabil- 
ities. On this aspect of the data, at least, Arbuthnot had been in error. 
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